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Alfred Schutz. amassed Papers. Vol. II: reports in Social conception. Nijhoff, 1976 (Phaenomenologica, Vol. 15)
From the "Editor's note": the current quantity, the second one of Alfred Schutz’s gathered Papers, comprises works in sociology from the interval 1940-1959 and – in a single case – from the 12 months 1932, chosen based on a desk of association drafted by means of the writer presently earlier than his dying. within the final weeks of his existence Schutz made plans to have the varied papers of his “American period” accrued and released in English, in publication shape. the cloth used to be to be incorporated in 3 volumes: one quantity, for which he selected the identify: the matter of Social truth, the current quantity of stories in Social conception, and one among experiences in Phenomenological Philosophy. He left few directions in regards to the latter volumes, except a provisional directory of things to be incorporated, yet nonetheless had time to offer a few inspiration to such editorial info because the subdivisions of the matter of Social truth, their series and the series of chapters inside of every one part. That used to be all. the remaining needed to be entrusted to others.
In his Preface to quantity I, Father H. L. Van Breda has recalled the most info of Alfred Schutz’s lifestyles and highbrow improvement, evoking the reminiscence additionally of his character as a guy and a pupil. Readers of the current quantity will locate those pages (Vol. I, pp. VI–XIII) in addition to the advent via Maurice Natanson (Vol. I, pp. XXV–XLVII) important towards a deeper figuring out of Schutz’s brain and work.
Hardcover: 315 pages
Publisher: Nijhoff, 1976 (Photomechanical reprint of: 3rd printing, 1971 [first: 1964])
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Der späte Husserl spricht von dem ,Ur-Ich’ als dem Ich, das der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität in einem gewissen Sinne vorangeht. Dies besagt aber nicht, dass es ein solipsistisches Ich wäre, das dem Anderen einseitig voranginge. Der Terminus ,Ur-Ich’ zeigt vielmehr die Ursprünglichkeit einer asymmetrischen und irreversiblen Relation zwischen Ich und Anderem zugespitzt an.
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Additional info for Bolzano’s Theoretical Philosophy: An Introduction
On Bolzano’s view, inclusion relations of the type Kant has in mind do not point to semantically interesting features of propositions: use of the notion of ‘inclusion’ and other cognates are “mere metaphors (bildliche Redensarten) that do not analyse the concept to be deﬁned or expressions which allow for too broad an interpretation” (1837, §148, 87). In general, it seems to him that deﬁnitions of logical notions such as analyticity that rest on the idea of inclusion: do not emphasise sufﬁciently what makes this type of propositions important.
More on the Bolzanian notion of synonymy in Chapter 5. Bolzano’s views on analysis are informed by his views on what makes for deductive languages in which sentences express their content completely. It is difﬁcult to exaggerate the import of this idea and the novelty of the resources Bolzano deployed at the time in order to bring it to fruition. Bolzano’s predecessors typically adhered to the picture theory of ideas (see Chapter 2). This naïve form of representationalism is based on the assumption that the relation between meaning (concepts) and referent (objects) ought to be explained by resorting to the notion of resemblance: the structure of meaning is in some determinate way deﬁned by analogy with the structure of the referent.
Whoever subscribes to (1) conceives of this relation in terms of “resemblance”. (1) expresses a naïve form of representationalism: a concept is in some substantial way determined by the features of the object it represents, and it represents things by virtue of “resembling” them. (1) supposes that the structure of (components in) concepts is in some systematic manner analogous to the structure of (properties in) objects. The kind of analogy adherents to (1) had in mind was typically based on the idea that concepts are “pictures” of the objects they represent; the idea that they are “pictures” of the objects they represent was meant to explain how they represent the latter, namely by virtue of their components’ corresponding to some features of the objects to which they refer.